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ARGUMENT1
POINT I: THE INTERVENORS HAVE CORRECTLY STATED
THEIR CASE REGARDING FARM PROPERTY
AND DESERET WATER STOCK
Both the Appellee Wife and Intervenor Parents correctly point out that the
resolution of the issue regarding ownership of the farm property and Deseret Water
stock "may affect the overall equity of the property settlement."2 Defendant Husband
had already acknowledged that the disparity in the property settlement would be
greater than already indicated were this Court to grant the same.3
Defendant Husband agrees with the Interveners that
[t]he [marshaled] evidence shows a joint farming venture. All parties
put money down. All parties contributed to monthly payments. All parties
paid toward principal and interest. All parties participated in farming. All
parties paid portions of the water stock assessments. All parties paid
towards the water stock debt.
The evidence is overwhelming that the land and water stock were
owned by all four of the parties. There is no factual support for the court's
findings that the Intervenors had no interest in real property (the farm) and
the Deseret Irrigation Company water stock. It is an abuse of discretion to
ignore the joint farming venture, to ignore the deeds, and to ignore what the
parties intended.4

1

To the degree this Court desires citation to the record rather than transcript
and documents included in the Addendum in Appellant Husband's Opening Brief, a
copy of the Opening Brief with all citations to the record included is included in the
Addendum.
2

Page 4, paragraph one of the Brief of Appellee-Wife; Page 1, paragraph 1 of
Appellant Intervenors.
3

Page 10, paragraph 1 of the Opening Brief of Appellant Husband.

4

Pages 5-6, paragraphs 4-5 of Brief of Appellant Intervenors.

1

Assuming that this Court would agree, the impact of allowing the award on the
Defendant Husband would be as follows:5

Present Status

Appellee-Wife

Appellant-Husband

$ 70,587

<$

$ 70,587

< $ 16,359 >

509 >

Adopting Intervenors'
Position

For reasons noted below, regardless of the position this court takes on the Intervenor
Parents' claims, the property division by the trial court is an abuse of discretion.
POINT II: THE PROPERTY DIVISION IMPROPERLY ADJUSTED FOR
THE PARTIES PRE-MARITAL POSITIONS AND MUST BE MODIFIED6
Appellee-Wife's citation of the general rule that equity requires each party retain
the separate property brought into the marriage7 failed to include standard exceptions
such as "whether the property has been commingled, whether the other spouse has by
his or her efforts augmented, maintained or protected the separate property, and

5

These figures are computed by taking the values of the property division
summarized on the Table on pages 7-8 of Appellant Husband's Brief and lowering the
value of the farm by fifty percent (50%) from $ 20,780, to $ 10,390 and lowering the
value of the Deseret Water stock fifty percent (50%), from $ 10,920 to $ 5,460. This is
done on the assumption that the parties and Intervenors are 50/50 joint owners.
6

The Appellee-Wife's Brief objects to the argument in Appellant-Husband's brief
that the court's findings were inconsistent regarding the award of the I.R.S. debt. In
light of the fact that no effort has been made to have the lower court correct a clerical
error pursuant to Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P., Appellee-Wife should be limited in continuing to
make the argument here, not having availed themselves of the opportunity in the court
below.
7

Appellee Wife's Brief at 10.
2

whether the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result."8 In this case, each
of these three standards is applicable, and when applied, indicates the property is
inequitable and an abuse of discretion.
First, as to commingling, in the Amended Findings, the trial court specifically
found that when the parties refinanced the Southgate, California, home that "[t]hese
debts and assets were all commingled, with the exception of the defendant's tax debt."9
There is no case law in Utah that directly establishes how a court would make a
determination that a pre-marital debt (as distinct from property) was not commingled
when assets that were used to pay the debt were, in fact, commingled. The debt was
satisfied by proceeds from a loan, incurred after marriage, and for which both parties
were liable, being secured by property in both of their names. The Appellee-Wife's
appellate brief did not address the argument that "no evidence exists to contradict that
the [I.R.S.] payment had been a gift or other non-liability situation from one spouse to
the other."10
Second, Appellee-wife's efforts to balance the disparate property division by
subtracting the initial equity the Appellee-Wife had in the home at the time of marriage
fails to take in to account that the Appellant-Husband contributed to the valuation of the
home by giving her all of his salary when he worked for Hughes or Quaker Oats11 as

8

Dunn v. Dunn. 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ct. App, Utah 1990).

9

Record at 162, lines 15-16.

10

Appellant Husband's Opening Brief at 11.

11

Record at 295-296.
3

well as repairing, painting and

)ther hor-

orovements (such as working on

a redwood deck for the home. 1 2 Furthermore, as the home in Southgate, California,
was "commingled," 1 3 and since marital efforts and funds helped enhance the value of
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Record at 295.

is n j S important to note that gross equity in a property brought into the marriage
does not equate with net proceeds or net worth (which is what was to be divided at the
time of the divorce.) Not only are there selling costs before net equity is obtained from
an asset, but also there is uncontroverted evidence that A p p o | | ^ - W i f e brought some

In addition, not only was the property commingled, but it was the AppellantHusband that brought in the expertise necessary to farm. While entering into the
farming operations was a joint decision,19 it was undisputed that the
Appellee-Wife was not involved in the farming operations and did not know how to run
or operate a farm.20
Third, in this case, the length of the parties' marriage indicates that it would be
inequitable to restore the parties to their pre-marital condition. Equitable efforts to
restore parties to their respective position before marriage is often emphasized when a
marriage is of a short rather than a long duration. Unfortunately, the case law is not
crystal clear on how to define what is a long or short marriage. For example, marriages
of approximately 38 years is of long duration;21 13 years is not short;22 7 years is of
short duration.23 In this case, the parties lived together for almost two years prior to

debt of an unknown amount into the marriage as well as that asset. See record at 295
in which Appellant says about Wife that "[s]he had a lot of credit cards when I married
her."
19

The record indicates that Elaine wanted to move to Utah because of the riots
in California, and she called the Interveners many times about finding a farm. They
found five farms and Appellee-Wife picked out the farm they purchased. See Record at
278-279,312,321.
20

Record at

21

Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076,

22

Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).

23

Rappleve v. Rappleve. 855 P.2d 260, (Ut. App. 1993).
5

(Utah 1988).

marriage24 and then were married for slightly over nine years.25 This marriage is not of
a "short duration;" therefore, the length of this marriage is not an equitable basis for
restoring the parties to their pre-marital positions.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED
ALIMONY AGAINST THE HUSBAND
Appellee-Wife has failed to respond to the arguments raised by AppellantHusband in that the third factor under the test enunciated in Jones v. Jones26 —
the ability of the payor spouse to provide for the same — was not addressed by the
court. Furthermore, any reference by Appellee-Wife to an "able-bodied" AppellantHusband is somewhat superficial; the trial court heard all of the evidence regarding the
Appellant-Husband's abilities, inability to find work, and the limited income available
from the joint farming enterprise27, and only imputed monthly income to him of $ 746.67.
Her income was $ 1,028.50.
The property settlement of the parties does not justify the imposition of alimony
on the Appellant-Husband; either he is in a negative position of < $ 509.00 >, or, if this
Court grants the Intervenors' Position, < $ 16,359.00>. On top of this, AppellantHusband does not have an asset or income producing base that would warrant the

24

Record at 297, lines 12-15.

25

The Motion of Appellee-Wife to Amend the Original Decree was filed with
sufficient time to arrest the original entry of divorce and postpone termination of the
marriage until entry of the decree.
26

700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

27

Record at 261, 263.
6

imposition of alimony.28
The effort to impose alimony and make the parties' monthly positions even more
disparate — $ 1,203.50 for Appellee-Wife and $ 571.67 for Appellant-Husband —
ignores basic reality that has been acknowledged previously by the Utah Supreme
Court. "When one blanket is cut to fit two beds, it seldom will cover them both."29 In
other words,
[t]his is one of those all-too-frequent situations where the court was
confronted with the impossible task of attempting to cut one blanket to cover
two beds and satisfy both parties when the truth of the matter is that they
cannot afford a divorce, but must have one anyway.30
The Appellee-Wife married Appellant-Husband "for better or for worse." "This does not
mean the 'better' for her and the 'worse' for him."31
Even were alimony justified, the provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) were not
followed. There was no limitation on the number of years alimony would be in effect.
At the trial, the Appellee-Wife only asked for alimony as long as the duration of the
marriage.32 There is no way to determine when alimony will terminate in this case.

28

Appellant-Husband testified that he lacks the funds for necessary capital
improvements and purchase of machinery for the farm. He is forced to hire outside
labor for the swathing, bailing, and related operations. (Record at 261, 265, 267.) His
is paying rent of $ 150.00 per month to his parents for a small trailer (Record at 259).
Appellant-Husband was also obligated to pay all outstanding debts of the marriage
(Record at 169.)
29

Gale v. Gale. 258 P.2d 986, 987 (Utah 1953).

30

Bader v. Bader. 424 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1967).

31

Anderson v. Anderson. 422 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1967).

32

Record
7

As the Decree does not comply with statutory requirements, Appellant-Husband should
be relieved of the effect of that judgment until it is corrected.
CONCLUSION
The Intervenor Parents have correctly claimed their portion of the joint
agricultural enterprises of the parties to this litigation.
It is not equitable to restore the Appellee-Wife to her premarital financial
condition because of extensive commingling of assets, contributions by the AppellantHusband, and the nine-year length of the parties' marriage.
Permanent alimony is not appropriate when Appellee-Wife's income and networth significantly exceed that of Appellant-Husband and statutory requirements were
not complied with.
For all of the foregoing, the trial court's division of property and award of alimony
are inconsistent in justification and create reversible error for an abuse of discretion by
imposing inequitable treatment on Appellant-Husband.
DATED this 26th day of September, 1997.
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.

Matthew Hilton
Attorney for Appellant-Husband

8

ADDENDUM

III. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The date of the order appealed from in this case is November 1, 1986. The
notice of appeal was filed on November 27, 1986. The Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C. A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
A post-judgment Rule 60(b) motion was heard June 17, 1997 and was orally
denied. The order denying the motion has not yet been executed or filed by the trial
court, and therefore is not, at this juncture, part of this appeal.
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue # 1 : Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to the
Appellee under the standard announced in Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)
and the statutory standards of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7).
"[A] trial court's award of alimony is reviewed for clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion." Endrodv v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah. App. 1996) (citation
omitted.) The issue was raised in pages 2-3 of the memorandum filed by counsel for
Appellant, Eldon Eliason, when he objected to the Appellee's motion to amend the
earlier order of the court which had not awarded alimony. The denial of alimony was
also addressed in Intervener's Objection to Amend the Findings (R. 116.), which were
concurred in by the Appellant by his counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996.
(R. 125-122.)
Issue # 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it assessed a judgment
against the Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256.72, which was
a payment of Appellee's pre-martial obligation to the I.R.S.?

1

u

[T]he trial court's property division is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard." Endrody v. Endrody. 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (Utah App. 1996) (citation
omitted).
Objections to the inclusion of an independent judgment for an I.R.S. obligation
were specifically raised in the arguments of the Intervenors in response to the
Appellee's Motion to Amend the Findings and Decree (R. 101 - 97.), which were
concurred in by the Appellant by his counsel in the objection filed on March 29, 1996
(R. 122.)
Issue # 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it entered a judgment
against the Appellee in favor of the Appellant in the amount of $ 20,256.72, when the
legal conclusion does not comport with the Findings of Fact made by the trial court?
If "a trial court should make findings of fact necessarily inconsistent with each
other, such action would be capricious and . . . such inconsistent findings would not be
permitted to stand." Malstrom v. Consolidated Theaters. 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah
1955).
An objection to the form and nature of the orders entered by the trial court from
which an appeal are taken need not be raised before the trial court when such orders
are prepared by the Appellee's counsel; in the alternative, if the pleadings are
improper, and were prepared by the Appellee's counsel, then the inconsistent findings
are to be stricken, along with the legal conclusion.
V. Dispositive Legal Citations
Dispositive legal citations in this case include the following:
2

U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1): "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in its equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties:
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h): "Alimony may not be ordered for duration longer than the
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of
alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony
for a longer period of time."
VI. Statement of the Case
After living together for approximately two years in California, (R. 297, lines 1215.), the Plaintiff-Appellee wife and Defendant-Appellant husband were married in
California on October 24, 1987. (R. 203, line 23.) In December of 1987, the parties
mortgaged what had been a pre-martial home of the Plaintiff, (which home had been
placed in the name of both parties). (Amended Decree, If 8, R. .) While some monies
were used for points, adding on to the home, and for an eventual down payment on a
farm in Utah, the majority of the funds were used to pay a premarital I.R.S. debt of the
Defendant. (R. 168.) The Defendant had not participated in making house payments
until he was married ( R. 297, lines 18-23). When working for Hughes or Quaker Oats,
Appellant gave all of his salary to the Appellee which she administered as she thought
best, (R. 298-299), from a joint bank account (R. 215, lines 20-25), he relying on the
community property provisions of the state of California (R. 299, lines 14-18). One-half
of the house payment was greater than the rent he would have been paying elsewhere
(R. 299, line 19 - R. 300, line 2.) He also worked on the home, including placing on a
3

redwood deck (R. 300, lines 3-4). In May 1990, the Appellee and Appellant purchased
a 70 acre farm in Delta, Utah. (R. 161, lines 17-20.) The parties separated in June of
1994. (R. 159, line 6.) Trial was held on October 13, 1995. (R. 185.)
During the trial, the trial Court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a premarital I.R.S. obligation of Appellant. In the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court found that an I.R.S. obligations of the Appellant incurred
prior to their marriage was not commingled with the property of the parties. The
amount of the obligation was $ 20,256.72. (R. 162-161, page 3-4, fl 8.) Thereafter,
however, the trial court found that the Appellant's I.R.S. obligations relative to the
Appellee were "one-half of which amount defendant may retain and one-half which the
plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of $ 10,128.36." (R. 157, page 8, U 25.) Thereafter
this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant in
the amount of $ 20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the defendant's debt
with the I.R.S." (R. 155, page 10, U 39.) The Amended Decree awarded judgment to
the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $20,256.72. (R. 168, page 3,1J11.) The
property distribution arising out of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law is properly summarized as follows:
Appellee

Appellant

Interveners

Assets
Sutherland Home
Water Payment
from Defendant

$36,250

Farm

$9,203

Melville
Water

$ 20,780

$27,900

4

Melville
Water $27,900

Deseret
Water
Payment from
Interveners

$ 4,500

Deseret Water
Shares

$

Judgment for
I.R.S. Gift

$ 20.256

Applt.
to Pay $ 2.700

$ 10.920

728

$ 59,600

$ 70,937

$ 30,600

Debts
1

/21992 I.R.S.Debt $

_350

Suther. Hm.
Loan
$25,000

Rental
Costs $ 4.500

Water
Liability $ 2,700
Water
Liability $ 9,203
Marital
Debts $ 2,600
Judg.
for IRS.
Gift
$ 20,256
1

$
NET PROPERTY

/21992
I.R.S.
Debt

$

350

350
$60.109

$ 70.587

(— $

509)

$ 4.500
$26.100

(The valuations of the home, farm, and water are taken from the Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 164-152.); the intervener's obligation of $ 4,500.00 to
Appellee is found on page 4, fl 9 (R. 161); intervener's loans to the parties in the

5

amount of f$ 2,700.00 is found on page 6,1J17 (R. 159.); page 10, U 5 (R. 155.); the
joint IRS tax liability for 1992 is found on page 11, j | 40 (R. 154.); the payment to the
Appellee for the water stock in the amount of $ 9,203.36 is taken from the Decree of
Divorce (R. 169.)
The trial court also found that the Appellee received $ 229.00 in a monthly
pension benefit and $ 799.900 in monthly social security disability benefits, for a total
monthly income of $ 1,028.50. Defendant had $ 736.67 income imputed to him. (R. 163,
U 5.) Alimony of $ 175.00 per month was awarded in favor of Appellee. (R. 163.)
Paragraph 7 b of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 162.) and
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree (R. 168.) did not designate when the alimony
was to terminate or any extenuating circumstances that justified an award of the same
beyond the time period of the marriage.
VII. Summary of the Arguments
The trial court's award of alimony clearly abused its discretion when it failed to
consider the binding standards articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Jones v. Jones.1
The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to properly take into account
the "ability of the husband to provide support."2 The trial court also failed to follow the
statutory requirements of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding alimony for an unlimited
time . The Court also abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a pre-marital
1

700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

2

Id. at 1075.
6

debt of the Appellant paid, in part, by Appellee, almost eight years before the decree
was entered and (2) entering a judgment that did not comport with the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
VIII. Argument
A. The Award of Alimony Was Clearly An Abuse of Discretion
The trial court found that Appellee had monthly income of $ 1, 028.50 and
Appellant had imputed monthly income of $ 746.67. When the alimony ordered by the
Court is taken into account, the monthly income of the Plaintiff-wife becomes $
1,203.50 and that of the Defendant-husband becomes $ 571.67. If a minimum debt
service of $ 300.00 per month secured by the Melville water stock (on which Appellant
has already received a cash payment for her portion) is made, the imputed income of
Appellant is lessened to $ 271.67. The payment of rent by Appellant in the amount of $
150.00 per month (R. 259, lines 17-22) would leave the Appellant with $ 121.67 for all
of the personal living expenses as well as other debt service imposed by the trial court.
Awarding alimony under these circumstance failed to take into account the financial
situation of the Appellant as required by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Jones
v. Jones. The property settlement and debt obligations of parties do not justify a
different result. When the division of property is completely resolved, the property
interests balance as follows: Appellee receives $ 70,587.00, Appellant receives a
negative $509, and Intervenors receive $ 26,100.00. (In the event that Intervenors are
granted additional relief, the disparity will increase.) For all of the foregoing, it was an
abuse of discretion to award alimony under the facts of this case.
7

Even if any award of alimony is proper, the provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h)
provide that u[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony,
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time." Paragraph 10 of the Amended Decree (R. 168.) did not
designate when the alimony was to terminate or any extenuating circumstances. As
the Decree does not comply with the statutory requirements, Appellant should be
relieved of that effect of the judgment until it is corrected in accordance with law.
B. Awarding Appellee the "IRS Judgment" Was An Abuse of Discretion
During the trial, the trial court reviewed an issue regarding the payment of a premarital I.R.S. obligation of Defendant Boyd E. Broderick. In the Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court found that this payment was to be divided
between the parties "one-half of which amount defendant may retain and one-half
which the plaintiff shall receive, in the amount of $ 10,128.36." (R. 157, ^ 25.)
Thereafter this Court concluded that the "Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the
Defendant in the amount of $ 20,256.72 which was paid by the plaintiff to satisfy the
defendant's debt with the I.R.S." (R. 155, H 39.) The Amended Decree awarded
judgment to the Plaintiff against the Defendant for $ 20,256.72. (R. 168, H 11.) The
amount of the judgment is in error for at least three reasons.
First, having already found in paragraph 25 of the findings that one-half of the
I.R.S. debt could be retained by the Appellant, or $ 10,128.36, an award of $
20,256.72 against the Appellant as a judgment for the entire I.R.S. payment is in error.
8

"The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by
a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law." Smith v.
Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Indeed, if "a trial court should make findings of
fact necessarily inconsistent with each other, such action would be capricious and that
such inconsistent findings would not be permitted to stand." Malstrom v. Consolidated
Theaters. 4 Utah2d 181, 290 P.2d 689, 690-691 (Utah 1955).
Second, assigning the Appellant total liability for the I.R.S. debt is an abuse of
discretion when no evidence exists to contradict that the payment had been a gift or
other non-liability situation from one spouse to the other.3 Had there been any intent to
hold the Appellant liable for the I.R.S. obligation, it could easily have been included in a
pre-marital or post-marital agreement4 or some other evidence of intent to hold a party
liable for a paid debt in the event of a divorce.
Third, for the significant disparity of property division, and the fact that the
Appellant contributed all of his salary during the marriage to the family checking
account in reliance on the marriage relationship,5 it is inequitable under the doctrine of

3

This concept follows the standard used in evaluating gifts and exchanges of
inherited or other property between spouses who later divorce. Osguthorpe v.
Osauthorpe. 804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah App. 1990), citing Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760
P.2d 304, 308(Utah 1988) (Emphasis added.) See also Willev v. Willev. 866 P.2d 547,
555 (Utah App. 1993).
4

Matter of Estate of Beesley. 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994).

5

See Hearing Transcript (R. 297-300.) pointing out that he had lived there for
two years before the marriage without making house payments (R. 297, lines 11-20),
did not participate in making house payments until he was married (R. 297, lines 1823), and when working for Hughes or Quaker Oats, gave all of his salary to the Plaintiff
which she administered as she thought best, (R. 296, line 7 - R. 295, line 15), from a

9

equitable estoppel (as raised in Appellant's answer) to now impose liability on him for
this newly created, inequitable obligation arising from conduct over nine years before.
There was no evidence introduced indicating that at the time of the payment of the
I.R.S. obligation there was a contemporaneous understanding or attempt by the
Appellee to hold the Appellant liable for the debt or that there was any intent to
preserve the payment as an asset of the Appellee.
Thus, regardless of the theory used, awarding an independent judgment for the
entire amount of the payment made for Appellant's pre-marital I.R.S. obligation does
not follow "logically from, [nor] is supported by the evidence and controlling legal
principles [or equity]." Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).
IX: Conclusion
The trial court abused its discretion in determining to award alimony to Appellee
as well as an judgment for a pre-marital I.R.S. obligation of the Appellant. In awarding
alimony, the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to consider the
binding standards articulated in the case of Jones v. Jones. 6 wherein the Utah
Supreme Court reaffirmed three factors that must be considered when making an
award of alimony. The trial court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to properly

joint bank account (R. 215, lines 20-25), he relying on the community property
provisions of the state of California (R. 295, lines 14-18), which payment was greater
than the rent he would have been paying elsewhere (R. 295, line 19 - R. 300, line 2.)
Having made such payments, and worked on the home, including placing on a redwood
deck (R. 300, lines 3-4), because of the marital relationship, the Plaintiff may not now
ignore the marriage relationship to regain a gift she made over nine years ago as part
of that relationship.
6

700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
10

take into account the "ability of the husband to provide support."7 The trial court also
failed to follow the statutory requirements of U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(h) in awarding alimony
for an unlimited time .
The trial court further abused its discretion in (1) awarding a judgment for a premarital debt of the Appellant paid, in part, by Appellee, almost nine years before the
decree was entered and (2) entering a judgment that did not comport with the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
X: Addendum
The following documents are included with Appellants' Opening brief as an
Addendum:
1. Amended Decree of Divorce dated October 31, 1996, filed November 1, 1996.
2. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions and Law, dated October 31,
1996, filed
November 1, 1996.
3. Notice of Appeal dated November 27, 1996, filed November 27, 1996.
4. Transcript of Trial, pages 1, 19, 77, 115-118.
5. Objection to Motion to Proposed Finding, Memorandum and Closing Argument
from Appellants' Counsel, pages 1-4.
6. Objection to Motion to Amend, etc., Interveners, pages 1, 5-6

7

Id. at 1075.
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